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397 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE COURTS, AND 
“PICKING WINNERS” 
Judge Thomas L. Ambro* & Paul J. Safier** 
Dean Robert Post’s book—Democracy, Expertise, and Academic 
Freedom1—reflects and requires serious thought about our First 
Amendment. This Essay addresses just two of the many interesting 
assertions Dean Post makes. The first is his claim that the advancement 
of knowledge in a democracy springs primarily from the knowledge that 
experts gather in discerning good from bad ideas, and that recognizing 
this value requires courts to develop criteria for determining which 
viewpoints are better in ongoing debates among experts. The second is 
Dean Post’s contention that the U.S. Constitution protects an individual 
right to academic freedom, which requires enforcing this right against 
academic institutions. The concern we have in each instance is with the 
role his theory assigns to courts in promoting some “experts” over 
others. 
I.  EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND THE COURTS 
Dean Post focuses much of his book on a contrast between the 
universal tolerance of expression traditionally associated with the First 
Amendment and the disciplinary practices that experts employ to 
produce knowledge. Proper appreciation of this contrast, he argues, 
requires revising many of our traditional conceptions of the First 
Amendment. 
To illustrate this contrast, Dean Post begins his work by noting that 
his knowledge of an oak tree in his backyard is simply a trusting of his 
senses, while his knowledge of the cancerous effects of cigarette 
                                                     
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
** Associate, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP, and former Law Clerk to Judge Ambro. The 
authors retain the copyright in this article and authorize royalty-free reproduction for non-profit 
purposes, provided any such reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington 
Law Review. 
1. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). 
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smoking is based on deference to the conclusions of “experts”2 who 
“deployed the full and elaborate apparatus of modern epidemiological 
and statistical science.”3 He argues that if the First Amendment protects 
the dissemination of knowledge to the public, then its application cannot 
be wholly characterized by “the egalitarian tolerance that defines the 
marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment.”4 That is 
because determining whether an expression is worthy of protection 
because it promotes knowledge requires determining whether that 
expression actually does so. And this in turn requires that “courts apply 
the disciplinary methods by which expert knowledge is defined.”5 Thus, 
Dean Post argues, “disciplinary practices that create expert knowledge 
[should be] invested with constitutional status.”6 That means that courts 
should develop “criteria to determine which disciplinary practices”7 are 
best so that they may adequately “distinguish[] good ideas from bad 
ones.”8 
In a nutshell, while the traditional marketplace-of-ideas model 
“requires that the speech of all persons be treated with toleration and 
equality”9 so that advancements in knowledge and ideas may occur,10 the 
democratic competency model Dean Post develops as a counterpoint 
does not demand such treatment.11 Ultimately, he argues as follows: 
                                                     
2. Id. at ix. Dean Post includes within the expert group primarily those who acquire knowledge by 
scientific inquiry, though he also includes those who are proficient in a profession such as law. See, 
e.g., id. at 47–53. 
3. Id. at ix. 
4. Id. at xii. 
5. Id. at 54. 
6. Id. at 96. 
7. Id. (emphasis in original). 
8. Id. at 34. 
9. Id. 
10. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail . . . .”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (explaining that 
“content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas 
or viewpoints from the marketplace’” (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))). 
11. See POST, supra note 1, at 34 (contrasting traditional First Amendment doctrine that “requires 
that the speech of all persons be treated with toleration and equality,” with the creation of expert 
knowledge that “requires that speech be subject to a disciplinary authority that distinguishes good 
ideas from bad ones”). Dean Post does not deny that the traditional conception of how the First 
Amendment operates captures the bulk of First Amendment doctrine. He simply argues that the 
egalitarian approach is particular to the public realm, where democratic legitimacy demands that all 
persons have at least “the opportunity to make public opinion responsive to their own subjective, 
personal views.” Id. at 27–28. He contends that in the private realm the First Amendment primarily 
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insofar as the First Amendment is fundamentally egalitarian in its 
application, it is not concerned with the promotion of knowledge; and, 
insofar as the First Amendment is concerned with the promotion of 
knowledge, it is not necessarily egalitarian in its application. 
We have two concerns with this position. First, it seems to rest on an 
implausible account of the theory behind the marketplace model, which 
is more focused on worries about the harmful effects of state power on 
free and open debate than on the criteria by which true knowledge is 
identified and produced. Second, Post’s suggestion that courts should 
take sides in ongoing factual controversies to promote the First 
Amendment value of “democratic competence” neglects an important 
aspect of First Amendment jurisprudence: the emphasis on minimizing 
the footprint of state regulation of speech. 
First, the contrast Dean Post draws between traditional First 
Amendment tolerance and the standards by which experts produce 
knowledge cannot carry the weight he attributes to it. Contrary to what 
he implies,12 there is nothing in the traditional First Amendment faith in 
the value of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate13 that requires 
any corresponding belief in the particular value—let alone equal value—
of each and every submission to that debate. The concern underlying this 
emphasis on robust and uninhibited speech is with the potential systemic 
effects on the quality of public debate where the government may 
suppress even speech that most listeners confidently view as “valueless.” 
As Chief Justice John Roberts recently noted in Snyder v. Phelps,14 the 
suppression of speech whose “contribution to public discourse may be 
negligible” can nonetheless have the general effect of “stifl[ing] public 
debate.”15 
Similarly, that private institutions do not produce knowledge by 
adhering to norms of content neutrality does not mean that a 
governmental norm of content neutrality cannot itself serve the purpose 
of advancing knowledge. It has never been part of the marketplace 
                                                     
serves a different value, one based on protecting sources of actual knowledge, not on the equal right 
of all to shape public opinion no matter how erroneous or wrongheaded their views. See id. at 34. 
12. See id. at 10 (arguing that equal tolerance for all contributions to debate cannot be accounted 
for in epistemic terms because “[i]t is not intelligible to believe that all ideas are equal” (emphasis 
in original)). 
13. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
14. 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
15. Id. at 1220; see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534, 
541 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The distaste we may feel as individuals toward the content or message of 
protected expression cannot, of course, detain us from discharging our duty as guardians of the 
Constitution.”). 
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theory to demand that private actors and institutions govern themselves 
along the lines of that theory. In fact, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo,16 the U.S. Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that a 
general commitment to fostering a “marketplace of ideas” justifies 
requiring private institutions to open themselves up to opposing 
viewpoints.17 The First Amendment protects the right of private actors 
and institutions to exclude disfavored speech and to enforce their own 
conceptions of orthodoxy.18 In other words, the marketplace of ideas that 
the First Amendment protects, properly understood, is made up of actors 
and institutions that do not internally operate under a marketplace 
model. 
What these last two points reduce to is that the First Amendment is 
peculiarly concerned with state action. Above all else, the Amendment 
expresses a fear of the dangers uniquely associated with government 
interference in the development and expression of ideas.19 It specifically 
bars “government control over the search for political truth.”20 
Accordingly, defending the pervasive First Amendment norm of content 
neutrality on the ground that it promotes the growth of knowledge does 
not require any sophisticated theory of the nature of knowledge. It only 
                                                     
16. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
17. See id. at 258 (“The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to 
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—
whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be 
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with 
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”). 
18. See, e.g., id.; R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 735 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(“The [F]irst [A]mendment is not ordinarily implicated when private actors design . . . restrictions 
on expression; indeed, in many instances the [F]irst [A]mendment has been held to guarantee 
private actors the right to make such restrictions.”); see also, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian 
& Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (The First Amendment prohibits state 
accommodation law from requiring inclusion of particular group within a parade because it is a 
“fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a [private] speaker has the 
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”). 
19. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“Premised on 
mistrust of government power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain 
subjects or viewpoints.”); see also Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 897, 918 (2010) (suggesting that the First Amendment “was designed to serve a quite limited 
purpose in preventing government suppression, rather than serving as a guarantor of the accuracy 
(or quality in general) of public debate”). 
20. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980) (emphasis 
added); see also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (The First 
Amendment guarantees “an open marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may 
compete without government interference.” (emphasis added)); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 
545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that “the forefathers did not trust any government to 
separate the true from the false for us”). 
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requires some belief that a society in which government coercion is used 
to “pick winners” in public controversies, including factual 
controversies, would in the long run be one in which the development of 
knowledge did not advance as much as it otherwise would.21 Others can 
decide whether that belief is empirically correct, but it is central to the 
First Amendment as we understand it. 
Second, Dean Post’s suggestions as to how courts should protect 
expert knowledge from political intrusion reflect a one-sided account of 
First Amendment values. The traditional conception of the First 
Amendment is that it mandates that government, including courts, 
refrain from “regulat[ing] speech based on its substantive content or the 
message it conveys.”22 As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski recently put it, 
“[t]he one guiding light of our First Amendment law is that government 
officials, and courts in particular, are not allowed to make judgments 
about the value of speech.”23 Dean Post rejects this, asserting that to 
promote the citizenry’s access to truthful information, courts must 
“attribute constitutional status to the disciplinary practices by which 
expert knowledge is itself created.”24 
Dean Post is, of course, correct that the First Amendment protects, 
among other things, the right of audiences to be exposed to valuable 
information, especially in the commercial speech context.25 But we have 
concerns about how, under his understanding, courts should enforce this 
right. An example Dean Post discusses in Chapter Two of his book 
highlights these worries. He poses a hypothetical state law prohibiting 
“persons from offering fee-for-service advice about a particular 
                                                     
21. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (“The First 
Amendment . . . reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on 
the Government outweigh the costs.”). 
22. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995); see also 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit the expression of 
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
23. United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the 
denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 457; see also Dible v. 
Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he degree of protection the [F]irst [A]mendment 
affords speech does not vary with the social value ascribed to that speech by the courts.” (quoting 
Kev, Inc., v. Kitsap Cnty., 793 F.2d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 1986))). 
24. POST, supra note 1, at 55. 
25. See id. at 38–43; see also, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 
U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (“First Amendment protection for commercial speech is 
justified in large part by the information’s value to consumers . . . .”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (“It is precisely this kind of choice, 
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely 
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.”).  
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homeopathic medical remedy.”26 A court confronted with a challenge to 
this prohibition “must determine whether First Amendment coverage is 
triggered by deciding whether prohibiting advice about the remedy does 
or does not suppress the circulation of knowledge. And it must make that 
determination by applying the methods of one discipline or another.”27 
But it is not clear how a court should do this. How does it choose which 
expert in homeopathic medicine to treat as authoritative?28 Why should a 
court defer to an expert in homeopathic medicine at all, rather than an 
expert in traditional medicine, who might be skeptical of the whole 
enterprise? Most importantly, what if the state of expert knowledge on 
this subject changes, such that a homeopathic remedy that was thought 
by many experts to be bogus turns out to be highly beneficial? In that 
case, does the constitutional status of the prohibition change as well? Or 
does a court’s prior judgment become constitutionally entrenched? 
In suggesting that courts aggressively take sides in “expert” disputes 
in this fashion, Dean Post underplays a central aspect of First 
Amendment doctrine—that even speech that serves no constitutional 
value must be under-regulated so as to avoid any possible chilling effect 
on protected expression. For instance, in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,29 the Court famously observed that “erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate” and that such statements “must be protected if 
the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they 
need . . . to survive.”30 This is so even though the Court has also held 
that there is not necessarily any “constitutional value in false statements 
of fact” per se.31 The same spirit animates the “overbreadth doctrine,” 
which “prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a 
substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the 
                                                     
26. POST, supra note 1, at 56.  
27. Id. at 57–58.  
28. Dean Post suggests that courts should be comfortable with assessing the reliability of claims 
to expertise, as Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence already requires such determinations. See 
id. at 8–9. But the reliability test under Rule 702 is not very stringent by design. See, e.g., Pineda v. 
Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 702’s requirements are applied 
inclusively not to pick the better argument, but to determine who is qualified to testify as an expert). 
That courts can—and, where possible, should—admit competing experts who qualify as such does 
not appear to be an option under the analysis Dean Post advocates. 
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
30. Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The First Amendment requires 
that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”). 
31. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never 
been protected for its own sake.”). 
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process.”32 This concern seems neglected in Dean Post’s theory, which 
counsels favoring some disciplinary practices over others. 
His response appears to be that the doctrines articulated in Sullivan 
and its progeny apply to speech on matters of public concern, whereas 
the recommendations he makes primarily concern expression in the 
private realm. But this overstates the contrast between how the First 
Amendment operates in the two contexts. While Dean Post is correct 
that, outside the context of public speech, the First Amendment allows 
for a more aggressive policing of the boundaries between truth and 
falsity,33 concern for allowing “breathing space” for freedom is 
nonetheless still a part of the analysis. Thus, for instance, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that even in the context of regulating fraud, 
legal standards must be crafted in a manner that allows “sufficient 
breathing room for protected speech.”34 These concerns are present even 
in the commercial-speech context, albeit typically with the caveat that 
commercial speech is less susceptible to chilling effects than other forms 
of speech because it is financially motivated.35 
In short, it is a fundamental aspect of the First Amendment that courts 
must construct and apply standards that not only correctly decide the 
cases before them, but also minimize any harmful effects their decisions 
will have on speech and debate outside the courtroom. Underlying this 
approach is a kind of intellectual humility that, while perhaps alien to the 
production of expert knowledge, is nonetheless central to First 
Amendment values. This is the other side of the coin from Dean Post’s 
analysis. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the 
marketplace generally sorts out ideas better and with more lasting effect 
than judges. The job of the latter is clearly cabined, for “the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of 
                                                     
32. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002). 
33. See POST, supra note 1, at 41 (“Because the constitutional value of commercial speech lies in 
the information that it carries, the state can engage in content discrimination to regulate and 
suppress the circulation of ‘misleading’ information. The contrast to permissible regulation[] of 
public discourse is stark. It would be forbidden content discrimination for the state to suppress 
‘misleading’ speech within public discourse.”); see also, e.g., Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 
F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (“If truth were a test for censoring noncommercial speech, 
the government could ban books that proclaim the earth is flat . . . .”). 
34. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003). 
35. See, e.g., Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (noting that particular features of commercial 
speech “may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the 
speaker”); see also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 681 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting from 
dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted) (questioning the constitutionality of a state 
false-advertising law on the ground that it might “chill” speech). 
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truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market.”36 The result may be messy and often exasperating, but it 
is how democracies work. Citizens in democratic societies best counter 
bad ideas from the ground up rather than with ill-informed judges 
making pronouncements from seemingly ex cathedra seats of judgment. 
II.  THE REGULATION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
In addition, we have practical worries regarding Dean Post’s 
treatment of academic freedom as an object of First Amendment 
protection. As he notes, the U.S. Supreme Court on occasion has spoken 
of academic freedom as a special First Amendment concern.37 For 
example, speaking specifically about research in the social sciences in 
his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,38 Justice Felix 
Frankfurter declared: 
For society’s good—if understanding be an essential need of 
society—inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, 
stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as 
unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from 
intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of 
wise government and the people’s well-being, except for reasons 
that are exigent and obviously compelling.39 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,40 which came out nearly ten years 
later, Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority, was even more 
explicit in making this connection between the First Amendment and 
academic freedom, stating that “[academic] freedom is . . . a special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a 
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”41 
Yet, as Dean Post points out, courts have eschewed developing 
special doctrines for protecting academic freedom as a constitutional 
ideal.42 For him, “the doctrine of academic freedom stands in a state of 
shocking disarray and incoherence.”43 He notes that at least one source 
of this lack of doctrinal clarity is a tendency to decide academic freedom 
                                                     
36. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
37. See POST, supra note 1, at 68–80. 
38. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
39. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
40. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).  
41. Id. at 603.  
42. POST, supra note 1, at 62. 
43. Id. 
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cases with reference to the public employee free speech cases like 
Pickering v. Board of Education44 and, more recently, Garcetti v. 
Ceballos.45 Under that line of cases, the speech of government 
employees can only receive First Amendment protection if that speech is 
essentially extramural; that is, if it is speech employees make as citizens 
rather than as part of their employment.46 Dean Post contends this 
framework is inadequate in the academic-freedom context.47 He argues 
that there is a distinct First Amendment interest in shielding from 
political intrusion the work scholars perform pursuant to their official 
duties, as this protects the creation and dissemination of expert 
knowledge (or, in Dean Post’s parlance, “democratic competence”).48 
On Dean Post’s theory, “First Amendment coverage should be triggered 
whenever [scholarship] is inhibited for reasons that do not depend upon 
ensuring disciplinary competence as determined by disciplinary 
experts.”49 
We agree that Garcetti and the public employee speech cases that 
preceded it do not account for the special interest in academic freedom 
identified in Sweezy and Keyishian.50 Nonetheless, Dean Post’s analysis 
                                                     
44. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
45. 547 U.S. 410 (2006); see POST, supra note 1, at 80–85 (discussing Pickering and Garcetti). 
46. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (“[T]he First Amendment does not prohibit managerial 
discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”).  
47. See POST, supra note 1, at 80–85. The majority in Garcetti expressly declined to answer 
whether “expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
48. See POST, supra note 1, at 72, 77. One of the rationales articulated in Garcetti is that any 
public employee’s free-speech rights that were not limited to off-duty speech would interfere with 
the government’s interest, as an employer, in controlling what is and is not said on behalf of the 
government. See 547 U.S. at 422–23. This emphasis on crafting a unified, official message runs 
counter to the pedagogical mission of the university. See POST, supra note 1, at 92 (“Were faculty to 
be merely employees of a university, as Garcetti conceptualizes employees, their job would be to 
transmit the views of university administrators. Faculty would then no longer expand knowledge, 
because they would no longer be responsible for applying independent professional, disciplinary 
standards.”); see also Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First 
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 991–92 (2009) 
(“The job of faculty is to produce and disseminate new knowledge and to encourage critical 
thinking, not to indoctrinate students with ideas selected by the government.”). In addition, there is a 
problem with even identifying what counts as extramural speech in the context of university faculty, 
whose job is in part to engage the broader public as public intellectuals. See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. of 
Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 564 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that opinion pieces 
published by a criminology professor were not legitimate bases for denying tenure even though they 
were submitted as part of his tenure file). 
49. POST, supra note 1, at 90. 
50. That is not to suggest that the Garcetti framework has no role to play in First Amendment 
cases involving public university faculty. Not all aspects of such employment trigger academic 
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may underplay the practical difficulties presented by the tension between 
academic freedom as an institutional right and as an individual right. As 
the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “[w]here . . . government attempts 
to direct the content of speech at public educational institutions, 
complicated First Amendment issues are presented because government 
is simultaneously both speaker and regulator.”51 Dean Post argues that 
this tension is illusory because the specific “First Amendment value at 
stake in academic freedom”—democratic competence—“encompasses 
both the ongoing health of universities as institutions that promote the 
growth of disciplinary knowledge and the capacity of individual scholars 
to promote and disseminate the results of disciplinary inquiry.”52 The 
touchstone, he contends, for all attempts to regulate academic speech—
whether coming from inside or outside the university—is that “a 
qualified faculty member cannot be reduced to the mouthpiece of non-
professional, non-scholarly assessments of relevant knowledge.”53 With 
that understanding, “[n]othing in the concept of academic freedom 
requires deference to university administrators who possess neither the 
capacity nor the pretense of exercising professional judgment.”54 
True enough, this last statement applies “when universities make 
executive decisions that do not purport to reflect professional 
standards.”55 But few cases will actually take that form, or at least do so 
in a manner that makes itself evident in the courtroom. An academic 
freedom case will rarely be as straightforward as a faculty member, who 
does valuable work, being denied tenure for transparently political 
reasons. Moreover, given the political disagreements that so often 
underlie legitimate academic disputes, it is not clear that even that kind 
of case would easily lend itself to judicial resolution. In practice, the 
issue often comes with facts set in shades of gray. For example, what 
about a case in which a faculty member is denied tenure at a public 
university based on a shoddy assessment of her scholarship? Would a 
                                                     
freedom concerns, or at least not academic freedom concerns that potentially implicate the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185–87 (3d Cir. 2009) (Ambro, J.) 
(analyzing the allegations of a public university professor that he was terminated based on his 
participation in the academic discipline process under the Garcetti framework).  
51. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 n.6 (1990); see also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 
736 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Let us not forget that academic freedom includes the authority of the 
university to manage an academic community and evaluate teaching and scholarship free from 
interference by other units of government, including the courts.”).  
52. POST, supra note 1, at 77 (emphasis in original).  
53. Id. at 89.  
54. Id. at 79.  
55. Id. 
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First Amendment claim in that context succeed? While there is no doubt 
a strong public interest in allowing unpopular ideas to be tested and 
developed in an academic setting, does not a university have the right to 
sort out (even, at times, incorrectly) those unpopular academic ideas that 
merit protection from those that are simply bad scholarship? Though it 
seems unlikely Dean Post necessarily disagrees with that, it is not clear 
that he has fully dealt with the practical consequences of that division of 
labor. 
In at least one case, a court followed the path it appears Dean Post 
advocates. In Kerr v. Hurd,56 a federal district court held that the 
plaintiff stated a valid First Amendment claim in alleging that the public 
medical school in which he taught disciplined him based on his 
advocacy of forceps deliveries over Cesarian sections.57 The court held 
that “where . . . the expressed views are well within the range of 
accepted medical opinion, they should certainly receive First 
Amendment protection, particularly at the university level.”58 The 
underlying ruling in Kerr may have been appropriate in the context in 
which it arose. Nonetheless, we are wary of taking constitutional sides in 
academic debates involving knowledge gleaned from scientific inquiry. 
That would seem to violate the First Amendment rights of academic 
institutions, and do so in a way that could cut off an important source of 
intellectual development: namely, the right of academic institutions to 
devote themselves exclusively to particular schools of thought. 
We suggest that Professor Judith Areen advocates a better approach.59 
She argues that where a faculty member challenges a termination or 
demotion based on “academic” speech, the university’s decision should 
be presumed to be made on legitimate grounds if supported by the 
faculty or by a faculty committee.60 If so, the aggrieved scholar can 
prevail only by showing that “the decision was ‘such a substantial 
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the 
faculty did not exercise its professional judgment.’”61 As Professor 
Areen notes, such an approach would allow courts to “avoid infringing 
the academic freedom of academic institutions.”62 In that way, courts 
can protect academic freedom in a manner that does not require them to 
                                                     
56. 694 F. Supp. 2d 817 (S.D. Ohio 2010).  
57. Id. at 834–35, 843–44.  
58. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).  
59. Areen, supra note 48. 
60. Id. at 995.  
61. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)). 
62. Id.  
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wade into ongoing academic debates. 
CONCLUSION 
Dean Post has written a valuable book supporting well the need for 
democratic competency as a First Amendment value. The concerns we 
express do not displace the core of that measure insofar as it deals with 
matters of knowledge attained through scientific inquiry. 
Nonetheless, whatever may be true about how expert knowledge is 
produced, we are uncomfortable with any suggestion that courts should 
jump into the briar patch and “determine which disciplinary practices 
implicate the value [of democratic competence] and which do not.”63 
That is a bridge far too far. Such an approach raises the specter of the 
elite deciding behind closed doors what ideas win and those that lose. As 
stated succinctly by Judge Damon Keith, “[d]emocracies die behind 
closed doors.”64 
We have related concerns about the role Dean Post assigns courts in 
protecting academic freedom as a First Amendment value. While we are 
sympathetic to his attempt to rescue academic freedom from the more 
general public-employee free speech cases, judicial doctrines in this area 
must minimize any intrusion by courts on the development and 
enforcement of academic standards by universities. 
 
                                                     
63. POST, supra note 1, at 96 (emphasis added). 
64. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). 
